Supplementary Information for
"Declared Support and Clientelism"

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A Comparative Statics for Deterministic Model

As discussed in Section 3.3, to determine the marginal effect of each variable on the share of citizens who declare for B (A), we determine the sign of the partial derivative of cutpoint $x_B^\star$ ($x_A^\star$) with respect to that variable. To determine the marginal effect of each variable on the fraction of citizens who remain undeclared, we consider the partial derivatives of $(x_B^\star - x_B^\star)$.

$$x_B^\star = \frac{-c_B - (q-\alpha)\gamma p_A + (1-q+\alpha)\gamma r_B}{\alpha+\delta} \qquad x_A^\star = \frac{c_A + (1-q-\alpha)\gamma p_B - (q+\alpha)\gamma r_A}{\alpha+\delta}$$

$$x_A^\star - x_B^\star = \frac{c_A + c_B + \gamma q(r_B + p_A - r_A - p_B) - \gamma\alpha(p_A + p_B + r_A + r_B) + \gamma(p_B - r_B)}{\alpha+\delta}$$

H1 *A's Reward Size*: $x_B^\star$ does not depend on r_A. The derivative of $x_A^\star$ with respect to r_A is $\frac{\partial x_A^\star}{\partial r_A} = -\frac{\gamma(\alpha+q)}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is always strictly negative. Regarding non-declarations, increasing r_A strictly decreases the numerator of $(x_A^\star - x_B^\star)$ and does not affect its denominator.

H2 *A's Support*: The derivative of $x_A^\star$ with respect to q is $\frac{\partial x_A^\star}{\partial q} = -\frac{\gamma(r_A+p_B)}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is always strictly negative. The derivative of $x_B^\star$ with respect to q is $\frac{\partial x_B^\star}{\partial q} = -\frac{\gamma(p_A+r_B)}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is always weakly negative. The derivative of $(x_A^\star - x_B^\star)$ with respect to q is $\frac{\partial(x_A^\star - x_B^\star)}{\partial q} = \frac{\gamma(r_B+p_A-r_A-p_B)}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is positive if $r_B + p_A > r_A + p_B$, 0 if $r_B + p_A = r_A + p_B$, and negative if $r_B + p_A < r_A + p_B$.

H3 *Cost of Declaring for A*: $x_B^\star$ does not depend on c_A. The derivative of $x_A^\star$ with respect to c_A is $\frac{\partial x_A^\star}{\partial c_A} = \frac{1}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is always strictly positive. Regarding non-declarations, increasing c_A strictly increases the numerator of $(x_A^\star - x_B^\star)$ and does not affect its denominator.

H4 *Monitoring*: The derivative of $x_A^\star$ with respect to γ is $\frac{\partial x_A^\star}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{(1-q-\alpha)p_B-(q+\alpha)r_A}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is positive if $(1-q-\alpha)p_B > (q+\alpha)r_A$, 0 if $(1-q-\alpha)p_B = (q+\alpha)r_A$ and negative if $(1-q-\alpha)p_B < (q+\alpha)r_A$. The derivative of $x_B^\star$ with respect to γ is $\frac{\partial x_B^\star}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{-(q-\alpha)p_A+(1-q+\alpha)r_B}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is positive if $(1-q+\alpha)r_B > (q-\alpha)p_A$, 0 if $(1-q+\alpha)r_B = (q-\alpha)p_A$ and negative otherwise. The derivative of $(x_A^\star - x_B^\star)$ with respect to γ is $\frac{\partial(x_A^\star - x_B^\star)}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{q(r_B+p_A-r_A-p_B)-\alpha(p_A+p_B+r_A+r_B)+p_B-r_B}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is positive if $(q-\alpha)p_A + (1-q-\alpha)p_B > (q+\alpha)r_A + (1-q+\alpha)r_B$, 0 if $(q-\alpha)p_A + (1-q-\alpha)p_B = (q+\alpha)r_A + (1-q+\alpha)r_B$ and negative if $(q-\alpha)p_A + (1-q-\alpha)p_B < (q+\alpha)r_A + (1-q+\alpha)r_B$.

H5 *A's Punishment Size*: $x_A^\star$ does not depend on p_A. The derivative of $x_B^\star$ with respect to p_A is $\frac{\partial x_B^\star}{\partial p_A} = \frac{(q-\alpha)\gamma}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is always strictly positive. The derivative of $x_A^\star - x_B^\star$ with respect to p_A is $\frac{\partial x_A^\star - x_B^\star}{\partial p_A} = -\frac{(q-\alpha)\gamma}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is always strictly negative.

H6 *B's Reward Size*: $x_A^\star$ does not depend on r_B. The derivative of $x_B^\star$ with respect to r_B is $\frac{\partial x_B^\star}{\partial r_B} = \frac{(1-q+\alpha)\gamma}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is always strictly positive. The derivative of $x_A^\star - x_B^\star$ with respect to r_B is $\frac{\partial x_A^\star - x_B^\star}{\partial r_B} = -\frac{(1-q+\alpha)\gamma}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is always strictly negative.

H7 *B's Punishment Size*: $x_B^\star$ does not depend on p_B. The derivative of $x_A^\star$ with respect to p_B is $\frac{\partial x_A^\star}{\partial p_B} = \frac{(1-q-\alpha)\gamma}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is always strictly positive. The derivative of $x_A^\star - x_B^\star$ with respect to p_B is $\frac{\partial x_A^\star - x_B^\star}{\partial p_B} = \frac{(1-q-\alpha)\gamma}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is always strictly positive.

H8 *Relative Impact of Rewards vs. Punishments*: $\left|\frac{\partial x_A^\star}{\partial r_A}\right| - \left|\frac{\partial x_B^\star}{\partial p_A}\right| = \frac{\gamma(\alpha+q)}{\alpha+\delta} - \frac{\gamma(q-\alpha)}{\alpha+\delta} = \frac{\gamma(2\alpha)}{\alpha+\delta}$, which is weakly greater than 0 for any $\alpha \geq 0$ (and strictly for any $\alpha > 0$). Similarly, $\left|\frac{\partial x_B^\star}{\partial r_B}\right| - \left|\frac{\partial x_A^\star}{\partial p_B}\right| = \frac{(1-q+\alpha)\gamma}{\alpha+\delta} - \frac{(1-q-\alpha)\gamma}{\alpha+\delta} = \frac{\gamma(2\alpha)}{\alpha+\delta}$, which is weakly greater than 0 for any $\alpha \geq 0$ (and strictly for any $\alpha > 0$).

H9 *Relative Impact of Rewards by A vs. Rewards by B*: $\left|\frac{\partial x_A^\star}{\partial r_A}\right| - \left|\frac{\partial x_B^\star}{\partial r_B}\right| = \frac{\gamma(\alpha+q)}{\alpha+\delta} - \frac{\gamma(1-q+\alpha)}{\alpha+\delta} = \frac{\gamma(2q-1)}{\alpha+\delta}$, which is greater than 0 if and only if $q > \frac{1}{2}$ and equal to 0 if and only if $q = \frac{1}{2}$.

H10 *Expressive Utility*: The derivative of $x_A^\star$ with respect to δ is $\frac{\partial x_A^\star}{\partial \delta} = -\frac{x_A^\star}{(\alpha+\delta)}$ which is positive if $x_A^\star < 0$, 0 if $x_A^\star = 0$ and negative if $x_A^\star > 0$. The derivative of $x_B^\star$ with respect to δ is $\frac{\partial x_B^\star}{\partial \delta} = -\frac{x_B^\star}{(\alpha+\delta)}$ which is positive if $x_B^\star < 0$, 0 if $x_B^\star = 0$ and negative if $x_B^\star > 0$. Regarding non-declarations, increasing δ strictly increases the denominator of $(x_A^\star - x_B^\star)$ and does not affect its numerator, which is always positive since, by assumption, $c_A + c_B > \gamma(q+\alpha)r_A$.

H11 *Election Influence*: The derivative of $x_A^\star$ with respect to α is $\frac{\partial x_A^\star}{\partial \alpha} = -\frac{\gamma(r_A+p_B)+x_A^\star}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is positive if $x_A^\star < -\gamma(r_A+p_B)$, 0 if $x_A^\star = -\gamma(r_A+p_B)$, and negative if $x_A^\star > -\gamma(r_A+p_B)$. The derivative of $x_B^\star$ with respect to α is $\frac{\partial x_B^\star}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{\gamma(p_A+r_B)-x_B^\star}{(\alpha+\delta)}$ which is positive if $x_B^\star < \gamma(p_A+r_B)$, 0 if $x_B^\star = \gamma(p_A+r_B)$ and negative if $x_B^\star > \gamma(p_A+r_B)$. The derivative of $(x_A^\star - x_B^\star)$ with respect to α is $\frac{\partial(x_A^\star - x_B^\star)}{\partial \alpha} = -\frac{\gamma(r_A+p_B+p_A+r_B)+(x_A^\star - x_B^\star)}{\alpha+\delta}$ which is positive if $(x_A^\star - x_B^\star) < -\gamma(r_A+p_B+p_A+r_B)$, zero if $(x_A^\star - x_B^\star) = -\gamma(r_A+p_B+p_A+r_B)$, and negative if $(x_A^\star - x_B^\star) > -\gamma(r_A+p_B+p_A+r_B)$.

B Comparative Statics for Stochastic Choice Model

As described in Section 3.4, we assume that citizens choose according to a Logit stochastic choice rule. The probability that citizen i chooses declaration action $j = \{A, B, \emptyset\}$ is:

$$\pi_j = \frac{exp(\lambda U_j)}{exp(\lambda U_A) + exp(\lambda U_B) + exp(\lambda U_\emptyset)} \tag{1}$$

where, using a compact notation, $U_A = EU_i(A)$ as in equation (1) in the paper, $U_B = EU_i(B)$ as in equation (2) in the paper, $U_\emptyset = EU_i(\emptyset)$ as in equation (3) in the paper and $\lambda \in [0, \infty)$ measures responsiveness to expected payoffs. The partial derivative of π_j with respect to parameter y is:

$$\frac{\partial \pi_j}{\partial y} = \frac{\lambda exp(\lambda U_j)\frac{\partial U_j}{\partial y}\left[\sum_{i \neq j} exp(\lambda U_i)\right] - exp(\lambda U_j)\left[\sum_{i \neq j} \lambda exp(\lambda U_i)\frac{\partial U_i}{\partial y}\right]}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2} \tag{2}$$

The denominator of (2) is always positive. Thus, $\frac{\partial \pi_j}{\partial y}$ is positive if and only if the numerator is positive. The text below refers to "Case 1" as one case in which it is easy to determine the sign of $\frac{\partial \pi_j}{\partial y}$: when parameter y only affects the expected utility from action j—that is, $\frac{\partial U_j}{\partial y} \neq 0$

for action j and $\frac{\partial U_i}{\partial y} = 0$ for both actions $i \neq j$. In this case, $\frac{\partial \pi_j}{\partial y} > 0$ if and only if $\frac{\partial U_j}{\partial y} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial \pi_{i \neq j}}{\partial y} > 0$ if and only if $\frac{\partial U_j}{\partial y} < 0$.

H1 *A's Reward Size*: As A provides larger rewards, declarations for A increase, declarations for B decrease, and non-declarations decrease.

The derivative of the expected utility from each action with respect to r_A is:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial r_A} = (q+\alpha)\gamma > 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial r_A} = 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_\emptyset}{\partial r_A} = 0$$

Marginally increasing r_A increases U_A for all citizens but does not affect U_B or $U_\emptyset$. Thus, we fall in "Case 1," and we have $\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial r_A} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial r_A} < 0$, and $\frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial r_A} < 0$.

H2 *A's Support*: Consider $r_B = p_A = p_B = 0$. As A's probability of winning increases, declarations for A increase, declarations for B decrease, and non-declarations decrease.

The derivative of the expected utility from each action with respect to q is:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial q} = x_i + \gamma r_A \qquad \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial q} = x_i \qquad \frac{\partial U_\emptyset}{\partial q} = x_i$$

Marginally increasing q increases U_A by $x_i + \gamma r_A$, U_B by x_i and $EU_\emptyset$ by x_i. We have:

$$\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial q} = \frac{\lambda exp(\lambda U_A)(\gamma r_A)\left[\sum_{i \neq A} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2} \qquad \frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial q} = \frac{-exp(\lambda U_B)\lambda exp(\lambda U_A)\gamma r_A}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2} \qquad \frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial q} = 0\frac{-exp(\lambda U_\emptyset)\lambda exp(\lambda U_A)\gamma r_A}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2}$$

$\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial q}$ is always positive; $\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial q}$ is always negative; and $\frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial q}$ is always negative.

H3 *Cost of Declaring for A*: As the cost of declaring for candidate A increases, declarations for A decrease, declarations for B increase, and non-declarations increase.

The derivative of the expected utility from each action with respect to c_A is:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial c_A} = -1 < 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial c_A} = 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_\emptyset}{\partial c_A} = 0$$

Marginally increasing c_A decreases U_A for all citizens but does not affect U_B or $U_\emptyset$. Thus, we fall in "Case 1," and we have $\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial c_A} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial c_A} > 0$, and $\frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial r_A} > 0$.

H4 *Monitoring*: Consider $r_B = p_A = p_B = 0$. As A's monitoring ability increases, declarations for A increase, declarations for B decrease, and non-declarations decrease.

The derivative of the expected utility from each action with respect to γ is:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \gamma} = (q+\alpha)r_A > 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \gamma} = 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_\emptyset}{\partial \gamma} = 0$$

Marginally increasing γ increases $EU_i(A)$, and does not affect $EU_i(B)$ and $EU_i(\emptyset)$. Thus, we fall in "Case 1," and we have $\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial \gamma} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial \gamma} < 0$, and $\frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial \gamma} < 0$.

H5 *A's Punishment Size*: As candidate A imposes greater punishments, declarations for A increase, declarations for B decrease, and non-declarations increase.

The partial derivatives of the expected utility from each action with respect to p_A are:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial p_A} = 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial p_A} = -(q-\alpha)\gamma < 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_\emptyset}{\partial p_A} = 0$$

Thus, we fall in "Case 1," and have $\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial p_A} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial p_A} < 0$, and $\frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial p_A} > 0$.

H6 *B's Reward Size*: As candidate B provides larger rewards, declarations for A decrease, declarations for B increase, and non-declarations decrease.

The partial derivatives of the expected utility from each action with respect to r_B are:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial r_B} = 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial r_B} = (1-q+\alpha)\gamma > 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_\emptyset}{\partial r_B} = 0$$

We fall in "Case 1," and have $\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial r_B} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial r_B} > 0$, and $\frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial r_B} < 0$.

H7 *B's Punishment Size*: As candidate B imposes greater punishments, declarations for B increase, declarations for A decrease, and non-declarations increase.

The partial derivatives of the expected utility from each action with respect to p_B are:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial p_B} = -(1-q-\alpha)\gamma \qquad \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial p_B} = 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_\emptyset}{\partial p_B} = 0$$

Thus, we fall in "Case 1," and have $\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial p_B} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial p_B} > 0$, and $\frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial p_B} > 0$.

H8 *Relative Impact of Rewards vs. Punishments*: Consider $r_A = p_A = r$, $c_A = c_B = c$, $\delta = 0$, $q \geq 1/2$. Among A's supporters, neutral citizens and weak B's supporters (that is, for $x_i > -\frac{q\gamma r}{\alpha}$), the marginal effect of r_A on increasing declarations for A is strictly larger than the marginal effect of p_A on decreasing declarations for B.

$$\left|\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial r_A}\right| = \frac{\lambda exp(\lambda U_A)(q+\alpha)\gamma\left[\sum_{i\neq A} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2} > \left|\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial p_A}\right| = \frac{\lambda exp(\lambda U_B)(q-\alpha)\gamma\left[\sum_{i\neq j} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2}$$

Rearranging we get:

$$\frac{exp[\lambda(2\alpha\gamma r + 2qx_i - 2c)] + exp[\lambda((\gamma r + x_i)\alpha + \gamma qr + 2qx_i - c)]}{exp[\lambda(2\alpha\gamma r + 2qx_i - 2c)] + exp[\lambda((\gamma r - x_i)\alpha - \gamma qr + 2qx_i - c)]} > \frac{q-\alpha}{q+\alpha}$$

Since $q \geq 1/2$, the RHS is smaller than or equal to 1. If $\alpha = 0$, the LHS is greater than 1 and the inequality holds for any x_i. If $\alpha > 0$ and $x_i > -\frac{\gamma qr}{\alpha}$, the LHS is > 1.

H9 *Relative Impact of Rewards across Candidates*: Consider $r_A = r_B = r$, $c_A = c_B = c$, $\delta = 0$, $q \geq 1/2$. Among A's supporters, neutral citizens and weak B's supporters (that is, for $x_i > -\gamma r$), the marginal effect of r_A on increasing declarations for A is strictly larger than the marginal effect of r_B on increasing declarations for B.

$$\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial r_A} = \frac{\lambda exp(\lambda U_A)(q+\alpha)\gamma\left[\sum_{i\neq A} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2} \quad > \quad \frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial r_B} = \frac{\lambda exp(\lambda U_B)(1-q+\alpha)\gamma\left[\sum_{i\neq j} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2}$$

Rearranging we get:

$$\frac{exp[\lambda(2q\gamma r+2qx_i-2c)]+exp[\lambda(q\gamma r+2qx_i-c+\alpha(\gamma r+x_i)]}{exp[\lambda(2q\gamma r+2qx_i-2c)]+exp[\lambda(q\gamma r+2qx_i-c-\alpha(\gamma r+x_i)]} \quad > \quad \frac{1-q+\alpha}{q+\alpha}$$

Since $q \geq 1/2$, the RHS is smaller than or equal to 1. If $\alpha = 0$, the LHS is equal to 1 and the inequality holds for any x_i. If $\alpha > 0$ and $x_i > -\gamma r$, the LHS is strictly greater than 1.

H10 *Expressive Utility*: As the utility of declaring in accordance with preferences increases, declarations for A increase among A's supporters, but decrease among B's supporters. Declarations for B increase among B's supporters, but decrease among A's supporters. Declarations by indifferent citizens are unaffected. The aggregate effect is ambiguous.

The derivative of the expected utility from each action with respect to δ is:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \delta} = x_i \qquad \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \delta} = -x_i \qquad \frac{\partial U_\emptyset}{\partial \delta} = 0$$

Marginally increasing δ increases the expected utility any citizen derives from supporting her favorite candidate, decreases the expected utility she derives from supporting the other candidate, and does not affect the expected utility from remaining undeclared. We have:

$$\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial \delta} = \frac{\lambda exp(\lambda U_A)x_i\left[\sum_{i\neq j} exp(\lambda U_i)\right] + exp(\lambda U_A)\left[\lambda exp(\lambda U_B)x_i\right]}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2}$$

which is positive if $x_i > 0$, equal to 0 if $x_i = 0$, and negative if $x_i < 0$.

$$\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial \delta} = \frac{-\lambda exp(\lambda U_B)x_i\left[\sum_{i\neq j} exp(\lambda U_i)\right] - exp(\lambda U_B)\left[\lambda exp(\lambda U_A)x_i\right]}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2}$$

which is positive if $x_i < 0$, equal to 0 if $x_i = 0$, and negative if $x_i > 0$.

$$\frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial \delta} = \frac{-exp(\lambda U_\emptyset)\lambda x_i\left[exp(\lambda U_A) - exp(\lambda U_B)\right]}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2}$$

Since $f(x) = exp(\lambda x)$ is strictly increasing in x, $exp(\lambda U_A) - exp(\lambda U_B)$ is positive if and only if $U_A - U_B$ is positive. Thus, $\frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial \delta}$ is positive if and only if $x_i(U_A - U_B)$ is positive.

H11 *Election Influence*: Consider $r_B = p_A = p_B = 0$. As the election influence of declaring increases: declarations for A increase and declarations for B decrease among A's supporters and sufficiently weak B's supporters (that is, if $x_i > -\frac{\gamma r_A}{2}$); declarations for A decrease and declarations for B increase among sufficiently strong B's supporters (that is, if $x_i < -\gamma r_A$). The aggregate effect is ambiguous.

The derivative of the expected utility from each action with respect to α is:

$$\frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \alpha} = x_i + \gamma r_A \qquad \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \alpha} = -x_i \qquad \frac{\partial U_\emptyset}{\partial \alpha} = 0$$

We have:

$$\frac{\partial \pi_A}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{\lambda exp(\lambda U_A) exp(\lambda U_B)(2x_i + \gamma r_A) + \lambda exp(\lambda U_A) exp(\lambda U_\emptyset)(x_i + \gamma r_A)}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2}$$

A sufficient condition for this to be positive is $x_i > -\frac{\gamma r_A}{2}$ and a sufficient condition for this to be negative is $x_i < -\gamma r_A$. For $x_i \in [-\gamma r_A, -\frac{\gamma r_A}{2}]$, the sign depends on other parameters.

$$\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial \alpha} = -\frac{\lambda exp(\lambda U_B) exp(\lambda U_A)(2x_i + \gamma r_A) + \lambda exp(\lambda U_B) exp(\lambda U_\emptyset) x_i}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2}$$

A sufficient condition for this to be negative is $x_i > -\frac{\gamma r_A}{2}$ and a sufficient condition for this to be positive is $x_i < -\gamma r_A$. For $x_i \in [-\gamma r_A, -\frac{\gamma r_A}{2}]$, the sign depends on other parameters.

$$\frac{\partial \pi_\emptyset}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{-exp(\lambda U_\emptyset)\left[\lambda exp(\lambda U_A)(x_i + \gamma r_A) - \lambda exp(\lambda U_B) x_i\right]}{\left[\sum_{i=\{A,B,\emptyset\}} exp(\lambda U_i)\right]^2}$$

A sufficient condition for this to be negative is $x_i \in (-\gamma r_A, 0)$. For other values of x_i, the sign depends on other parameters.

C Strategic Model of Declared Support

To clarify the logic by which declarations can affect other citizens' vote intentions and, thus, electoral outcomes, we analyze the stylized case in which there are two voters, V_1, V_2. Ideological preferences are a voter's private information but their distribution is common knowledge: x_1, x_2 are IID draws from $f \sim U[-k,k]$.[1] Voters derive "joy of winning" if they vote for the election winner, $R > 0$. This is the timing of the game:

1. V_1 decides whether to declare support for A (at cost $c_A > 0$), declare support for B (at cost $c_B > 0$) or remain undeclared.
2. V_2 observes V_1's decision.
3. On election day, V_2 decides whether to vote for A, vote for B, or to abstain. If he votes, V_2 incurs cost $c_2 > 0$. V_1 votes according to his declaration.
4. The election winner is determined as a function of the citizens' votes. We assume that the probability a candidate wins is increasing in the absolute amount of votes received by V_1 and V_2. This is meant to capture the fact that, while we model the strategic interaction between a subset of voters (e.g., two neighbors who can monitor each other's declarations), the electorate is potentially larger. In particular, we make the following assumptions:
   - If A receives 2 votes more than B, A wins with probability 1.
   - If A receives 1 vote more than B, A wins with probability $q \in (1/2, 3/4)$.
   - If A and B receive the same number of votes, A wins with probability $1/2$.
   - If A receives 1 vote less than B, A wins with probability $(1-q) \in (1/4, 1/2)$.

[1] As long as k is sufficiently large, all probabilities presented below are between 0 and 1.

- If A receives 2 votes less than B, A wins with probability 0.

5. If A wins and V_1 is observed to declare support for A, A distributes rewards r_A to V_1; if A wins and V_1 is observed to declare support for B, A doles out punishment p_A to V_1; if B wins and V_1 is observed to declare support for B, B distributes rewards r_B to V_1.

Since this is a sequential game, we solve it with backward induction.

Stage 2: V_2's Voting Decision

CASE 1: V_1 did not declare support for either candidate in Stage 1

The expected utility that V_2 derives from the three actions are:

$$EU_2(A) = q(x_2 + R) - c_2 \qquad EU_2(B) = qR + (1-q)x_2 - c_2 \qquad EU_2(\emptyset) = 0.5x_2$$

V_2 prefers to vote for A rather than abstaining if and only if $x_2 > x^1_{2A} = \frac{c_2 - qR}{q-0.5}$.

V_2 prefers to vote for B rather than abstaining if and only if $x_2 < x^1_{2B} = -\frac{c_2 - qR}{q-0.5}$.

We assume $c_2 > qR$ so that have $x^1_{2A} > x^1_{2B}$ and, thus, some abstention: V_2 votes for A if $x_2 \geq x^1_{2A}$, votes for B if $x_2 \leq x^1_{2B}$ and abstains if $x_2 \in (x^1_{2A}, x^1_{2B})$.

From the perspective of V_1 — after he decides to remain undeclared but before the election — the probability that V_2 votes for A is equal to the probability that x_2 is greater than x^1_{2A}; the probability that V_2 votes for B is equal to the probability that x_2 is lower than x^1_{2B}; and the probability that V_2 abstains is equal to the probability that x_2 is between x^1_{2B} and x^1_{2A}. Since x_2 is distributed uniformly between $-k$ and k, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for A}|V_1 \text{ abstains}] &= 1 - F(x^1_{2A}) = \frac{k(2q-1) + 2qR - 2c_2}{(4q-2)k} \\
Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for B}|V_1 \text{ abstains}] &= F(x^1_{2B}) = \frac{k(2q-1) + 2qR - 2c_2}{(4q-2)k} \\
Pr[V_2 \text{ abstains}|V_1 \text{ abstains}] &= F(x^1_{2A}) - F(x^1_{2B}) = \frac{-2Rq + 2c_2}{(2q-1)k}
\end{aligned}$$

CASE 2: V_1 declared support for A in Stage 1

The expected utility that V_2 derives from the three actions are:

$$EU2(A) = (x_2 + R) - c_2 \qquad EU2(B) = \frac{R}{2} + \frac{x_2}{2} - c_2 \qquad EU2(\emptyset) = qx_2$$

V_2 prefers to vote for A rather than abstaining if and only if $x_2 > x^2_{2A} = \frac{c_2 - R}{1-q}$.

V_2 prefers to vote for B rather than abstaining if and only if $x_2 < x^2_{2B} = -\frac{c_2 - R}{1-q}$.

We compute the distribution of V_2's actions from V_1's perspective as above and we get:

$$\begin{aligned}
Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for A}|V_1 \text{ declares for } A] &= 1 - F(x^2_{2A}) = \frac{k(q-1) - R + c_2}{2(q-1)k} \\
Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for B}|V_1 \text{ declares for } A] &= F(x^2_{2B}) = \frac{-2c_2 + R + k(2q-1)}{(4q-2)k} \\
Pr[V_2 \text{ abstains}|V_1 \text{ declares for } A] &= F(x^2_{2A}) - F(x^2_{2B}) = \frac{Rq - c_2}{4kq^2 - 6kq + 2k}
\end{aligned}$$

CASE 3: V_1 declared support for B in Stage 1

The expected utility that V_2 derives from the three actions are:

$$EU2(A) = \frac{x_2 + R}{2} - c_2 \qquad EU2(B) = R - c_2 \qquad EU2(\emptyset) = (1-q)x_2$$

V_2 prefers to vote for A rather than abstaining if and only if $x_2 > x_{2A}^3 = \frac{c_2 - 0.5R}{q - 0.5}$.
V_2 prefers to vote for B rather than abstaining if and only if $x_2 < x_{2B}^3 = -\frac{c_2 - R}{1-q}$.
We compute the distribution of V_2's actions from V_1's perspective as above and we get:

$$\begin{aligned}
Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for A}|V_1 \text{ declares for } B] &= 1 - F(x_{2A}^3) = \frac{-2c_2 + R + k(2q-1)}{(4q-2)k} \\
Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for B}|V_1 \text{ declares for } B] &= F(x_{2B}^3) = \frac{k(q-1) - R + c_2}{2(q-1)k} \\
Pr[V_2 \text{ abstains}|V_1 \text{ declares for } B] &= F(x_{2A}^3) - F(x_{2B}^3) = \frac{Rq - c_2}{4kq^2 - 6kq + 2k}
\end{aligned}$$

Summing up the results from Stage 2, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for A}|V_1 \text{ undeclared}] = Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for B}|V_1 \text{ undeclared}] &= \frac{k(2q-1) + 2qR - 2c_2}{(4q-2)k} \\
Pr[V_2 \text{ abstains}|V_1 \text{ undeclared}] &= \frac{-2Rq + 2c_2}{(2q-1)k} \\
Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for A}|V_1 \text{ declared for A}] = Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for B}|V_1 \text{ declared for } B] &= \frac{k(q-1) - R + c_2}{2(q-1)k} \\
Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for B}|V_1 \text{ declared for A}] = Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for A}|V_1 \text{ declared for B}] &= \frac{-2c_2 + R + k(2q-1)}{(4q-2)k} \\
Pr[V_2 \text{ abstains}|V_1 \text{ declared for A or B}] &= \frac{Rq - c_2}{4kq^2 - 6kq + 2k}
\end{aligned}$$

It is evident that $Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for A}|V_1 \text{ declared for A}] > Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for A}|V_1 \text{ undeclared}]$ and that $Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for A}|V_1 \text{ undeclared}] > Pr[V_2 \text{ votes for A}|V_1 \text{ declared for B}]$.

Stage 1: V_1's Declaration Decision

From the perspective of V_1: the probability that A wins the election if he does not declare support for either candidate is $\frac{1}{2}$; the probability that A wins the election if he declares support for A is $\frac{R+3k}{4k}$; the probability that A wins the election if he declares support for B is $\frac{-R+k}{4k}$. Since $R > 0 > -k$, we have that Pr[A wins if V_1 declares for A] $>$ Pr [A wins if V_1 undeclared] $= \frac{1}{2}$ $>$ Pr [A wins if V_1 declares for B].[2] Consider now V_1's decision.

V_1 prefers to declare support for A rather than remaining undeclared if and only if:

$$\begin{aligned}
EU(A) &> EU(\emptyset) \\
x_1 &> x_{1A}^\star = \frac{k(-3\gamma r_A - 3R + 4c_A) - R\gamma r_A - R^2}{(4\delta + 1)k + R}
\end{aligned}$$

V_1 prefers to declare support for B rather than remaining undeclared if and only if:

$$\begin{aligned}
EU(B) &> EU(\emptyset) \\
x_1 &< x_{1B}^\star = \frac{k(3R + (-p_A + 3r_B)\gamma - 4c_B) + (R + \gamma(p_A + r_B))R}{(4\delta + 1)k + R}
\end{aligned}$$

[2]Note that this model endogenizes the probability that A wins as a function of declarations and shows one channel that can lead to $\alpha > 0$ in a strategic environment with multiple voters.

If we assume $r_B = p_A = 0$ as in most experimental treatments, the cutoff becomes:

$$x_1 < x^{\star}_{1B} = \frac{k(3R - 4c_B) + R^2}{(4\delta + 1)k + R}$$

We obtain comparative statics by taking the partial derivatives of each cutoff. Hypotheses below are enumerated to facilitate comparison with main paper's hypotheses; since in this model the probability A wins is endogenous and (as in the experiment) B does not impose punishments, there are no counterparts of H2, H7, H9 and H11:

H1 *A's Reward Size*: As r_A increases, declarations for A increase $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1A}}{\partial r_A} < 0\right)$; declarations for B are unaffected $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1B}}{\partial r_A} = 0\right)$; non-declarations decrease $\left(\frac{\partial (x^{\star}_{1A} - x^{\star}_{1B})}{\partial r_A} < 0\right)$.

H3 *Cost of Declaring for A*: As c_A increases, declarations for A decrease $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1A}}{\partial c_A} > 0\right)$; declarations for B are unaffected $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1B}}{\partial c_A} = 0\right)$; non-declarations increase $\left(\frac{\partial (x^{\star}_{1A} - x^{\star}_{1B})}{\partial c_A} > 0\right)$.

H4 *Monitoring*: As γ increases, declarations for A increase $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1A}}{\partial \gamma} < 0\right)$; declarations for B are unaffected $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1B}}{\partial \gamma} = 0\right)$; and non-declarations decrease $\left(\frac{\partial (x^{\star}_{1A} - x^{\star}_{1B})}{\partial \gamma} < 0\right)$

H5 *A's Punishment Size*: Assume $k > R$. As p_A increases, declarations for A are unaffected $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1A}}{\partial p_A} = 0\right)$, declarations for B decrease $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1B}}{\partial p_A} < 0\right)$, and non-declarations increase $\left(\frac{\partial (x^{\star}_{1A} - x^{\star}_{1B})}{\partial p_A} > 0\right)$.

H6 *B's Reward Size*: As r_B increases, declarations for A are unaffected $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1A}}{\partial r_B} = 0\right)$; declarations for B increase $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1B}}{\partial r_B} > 0\right)$; and non declarations decrease $\left(\frac{\partial (x^{\star}_{1A} - x^{\star}_{1B})}{\partial r_B} < 0\right)$.

H8 *Relative Impact of Rewards vs. Punishments*: Rewards affect declarations relatively more than punishments of comparable magnitude. $\left(\left|\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1A}}{\partial r_A}\right| - \left|\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1B}}{\partial p_A}\right|\right) > 0$.

H10 *Expressive Utility*: As δ increases, declarations for A increase if and only if $x^{\star}_{1A} > 0$ $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1A}}{\partial \gamma} < 0 \text{ if and only if } x^{\star}_{1A} > 0\right)$; declarations for B increase if and only if $x^{\star}_{1B} < 0$ $\left(\frac{\partial x^{\star}_{1B}}{\partial \gamma} > 0 \text{ if and only if } x^{\star}_{1B} < 0\right)$. The effect on non-declarations depend on the parameters.

D Characteristics of Online Sample vs. Brazil Overall

Table 1: Characteristics of Online Sample vs. Brazil Overall

	Online Sample	**Brazil Overall**
Gender		
Female	46.2%	49.0%
Male	53.8%	51.0%
Age		
18-29	34.9%	31.0%
30-39	15.7%	22.3%
40-49	18.4%	18.5%
50-59	21.9%	13.6%
60-69	7.6%	8.1%
70+	1.5%	6.4%
Region		
Center-West	6.2%	7.4%
North	4.9%	8.3%
Northeast	30.6%	27.8%
South	20.0%	14.4%
Southeast	38.4%	42.1%
Urban		
Rural	19.2%	15.6%
Urban	80.8%	84.4%
Education		
No Education	1.4%	11.2%
Incomplete Primary	11.4%	30.6%
Complete Primary	9.3%	9.1%
Incomplete Secondary	10.0%	3.9%
Complete Secondary	26.4%	26.3%
Incomplete Tertiary	19.3%	3.4%
Complete Tertiary	22.3%	15.3%

Notes: Characteristics of online sample are self-reported by participants in the declared support experiment. These participants were recruited through Facebook advertisements, as described in Section 4 of the paper. Characteristics of Brazil overall reflect data from Brazil's census bureau (*Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*); more specifically, from its 2010 census (gender, age, region and urban) and its 2016 PNAD Continua (education).

E Robustness Across Education Level

Table 2: Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Rewards (Logit)

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
No Clientelism	-0.096**	-0.081**	0.038	0.025	0.058**	0.056*
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Lopsided Election	0.039	0.067*	-0.015	-0.023	-0.024	-0.043*
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Cost	-0.051*	-0.056*	0.035	0.045	0.016	0.011
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Low Monitoring	-0.044	-0.016	0.032	0.008	0.012	0.009
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Expressive Utility	-0.010	0.025	0.048*	0.043	-0.039*	-0.068**
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.021)
No Election Influence	0.004	0.015	-0.021	-0.019	0.018	0.004
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Competitive Clientelism	-0.040	-0.051*	0.076**	0.081**	-0.037	-0.030
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Round	0.008**	0.004	-0.008**	-0.003	0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Partisan Type	0.003**	0.004**	-0.002**	-0.003**	-0.002**	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Screener	0.011	0.015	-0.010	-0.041*	-0.001	0.025
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Subjects Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Above-Median Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	4976	3536	4976	3536	4976	3536

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. *Baseline Clientelism* is the excluded treatment category, so that coefficients report differences from that baseline. Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported. Above-median education indicates respondents above high-school completion (the median education level in our sample).

Table 3: Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Punishments Only (Logit)

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Punishment Only	0.057*	0.052	-0.019	-0.038	-0.038	-0.014
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.031)
Round	0.008	0.003	-0.017**	0.002	0.009*	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Partisan Type	0.002**	0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Screener	0.010	-0.035	-0.021	-0.021	0.011	0.055**
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Subjects Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Above-Median Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	1244	884	1244	884	1244	884

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. To isolate causal effects, the regressions in this table employ *No Clientelism* as the excluded category. Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported. Above-median education indicates respondents above high-school completion (the median education level in our sample).

Table 4: Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Clientelism & Punishment (Logit)

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Clientelism & Punishment	0.039	0.063	-0.012	0.029	-0.026	-0.093**
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.029)
Round	0.009	0.010	-0.014**	-0.002	0.005	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Partisan Type	0.003**	0.005**	-0.002**	-0.003**	-0.001*	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Screener	0.006	-0.013	-0.018	-0.035*	0.012	0.047**
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Subjects Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Above-Median Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	1244	884	1244	884	1244	884

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. To isolate causal effects, the regressions in this table employ *Punishment Only* as the excluded category. Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported. Above-median education indicates respondents above high-school completion (the median education level in our sample).

Table 5: Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Rewards (Logit), with Subject Fixed Effects

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
No Clientelism	-0.123**	-0.113**	0.050	0.035	0.095**	0.099*
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.039)
Lopsided Election	0.049	0.091*	-0.019	-0.033	-0.040	-0.075*
	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.035)
Cost	-0.066*	-0.080*	0.047	0.066	0.026	0.020
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.038)
Low Monitoring	-0.056*	-0.023	0.042	0.011	0.019	0.015
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.037)
Expressive Utility	-0.012	0.036	0.065*	0.061	-0.064*	-0.119**
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.035)
No Election Influence	0.005	0.020	-0.029	-0.027	0.029	0.008
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.038)
Competitive Clientelism	-0.051	-0.071*	0.103**	0.117**	-0.060*	-0.052
	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.036)
Round	0.010**	0.007*	-0.012**	-0.005	0.003	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Subjects Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Above-Median Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	3880	2552	3704	2432	3032	2024

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. *Baseline Clientelism* is the excluded treatment category, so that coefficients report differences from that baseline. Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported. Above-median education indicates respondents above high-school completion (the median education level in our sample).

Table 6: Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Punishments Only (Logit), with Subject Fixed Effects

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Punishment Only	0.164**	0.156**	-0.067	-0.135*	-0.140**	-0.069
	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.053)	(0.067)
Round	0.016	0.017	-0.040**	0.005	0.032**	-0.032*
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Subjects Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Above-Median Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	444	278	406	250	338	216

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. To isolate causal effects, the regressions in this table employ *No Clientelism* as the excluded category. Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported. Above-median education indicates respondents above high-school completion (the median education level in our sample).

Table 7: Estimates of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Clientelism & Punishment (Logit), with Subject Fixed Effects

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Clientelism & Punishment	0.111*	0.186**	-0.035	0.100	-0.103	-0.392**
	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.061)
Round	0.025*	0.047**	-0.035**	-0.044**	0.018	-0.043*
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Subjects Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Above-Median Education	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	462	292	426	242	316	222

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. To isolate causal effects, the regressions in this table employ *Punishment Only* as the excluded category. Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported. Above-median education indicates respondents above high-school completion (the median education level in our sample).

F Robustness to Outcomes in Prior Rounds

Table 8: Estimates of Average Treatment Effects, Rewards (Logit), Robustness to Controlling for Tickets Won in Previous Round

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
Treatment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
No Clientelism	-0.086**	-0.121**	0.024	0.043*	0.062**	0.107**
	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.025)
Lopsided Election	0.057**	0.084**	-0.034*	-0.051*	-0.022	-0.046*
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Cost	-0.050**	-0.077**	0.036*	0.070**	0.014	0.015
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.023)
Low Monitoring	-0.019	-0.035	0.011	0.025	0.007	0.015
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.024)
Competitive Clientelism	-0.037*	-0.055*	0.070**	0.104**	-0.033*	-0.056*
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Expressive Utility	0.011	0.009	0.037*	0.062**	-0.048**	-0.086**
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.023)
No Election Influence	0.003	0.001	-0.014	-0.011	0.011	0.013
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.023)
Round	0.008**	0.011**	-0.006**	-0.009**	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Partisan Type	0.004**		-0.002**		-0.002**	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Screener	0.014		-0.027**		0.012	
	(0.010)		(0.009)		(0.009)	
Tickets in Prior Round	0.000	-0.000	-0.001**	-0.000	0.001**	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Subject Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	9055	6737	9055	6291	9055	5176

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. *Baseline Clientelism* is the excluded treatment category, so that coefficients report differences from that baseline. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject in columns 1, 3 and 5, are reported in parentheses.

Table 9: Estimates of Average Treatment Effects, Punishment Only (Logit), Robustness to Controlling for Tickets Won in Previous Round

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
Treatment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Punishment Only	0.056**	0.179**	-0.026	-0.116**	-0.030	-0.115**
	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.042)	(0.019)	(0.044)
Round	0.008	0.000	-0.006	0.000	-0.002	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.011)
Partisan Type	0.002**		-0.002**		-0.000	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Screener	-0.013		-0.023*		0.035**	
	(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.011)	
Tickets in Prior Round	-0.000	-0.004**	-0.001	0.004**	0.001*	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Subjects Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2253	670	2253	560	2253	506

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. To isolate causal effects, the regressions in this table employ *No Clientelism* as the excluded category. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject in columns 1, 3 and 5, are reported in parentheses.

Table 10: Estimates of Average Treatment Effects, Clientelism & Punishment (Logit), Robustness to Controlling for Tickets Won in Previous Round

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
Treatment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Clientelism & Punishment	0.042*	0.123**	0.008	0.008	-0.050**	-0.182**
	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.019)	(0.039)	(0.018)	(0.043)
Round	0.011**	0.048**	-0.008*	-0.045**	-0.004	-0.012
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.012)
Partisan Type	0.004**		-0.002**		-0.001**	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)	
Screener	-0.008		-0.021		0.028**	
	(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.010)	
Tickets in Prior Round	-0.000	-0.003	-0.001	0.002	0.001*	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Subjects Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2275	718	2275	630	2275	528

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. To isolate causal effects, the regressions in this table employ *Punishment Only* as the excluded category. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject in columns 1, 3 and 5, are reported in parentheses.

Table 11: Estimates of Average Treatment Effects, Rewards (Logit), Robustness to Controlling for Total Tickets Won in All Previous Rounds

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
Treatment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
No Clientelism	-0.088**	-0.114**	0.033*	0.043*	0.055**	0.095**
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.023)
Lopsided Election	0.059**	0.076**	-0.034*	-0.046*	-0.025	-0.042*
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.022)
Cost	-0.057**	-0.076**	0.047**	0.065**	0.010	0.018
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.022)
Low Monitoring	-0.026	-0.035	0.015	0.020	0.011	0.019
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.022)
Competitive Clientelism	-0.045**	-0.060**	0.079**	0.112**	-0.034**	-0.059**
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.021)
Expressive Utility	0.013	0.017	0.035*	0.050*	-0.049**	-0.084**
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.021)
No Election Influence	-0.001	-0.000	-0.011	-0.016	0.011	0.020
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.022)
Round	0.004	0.022**	0.009	-0.023**	-0.011*	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Partisan Type	0.004**		-0.002**		-0.002**	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Screener	0.013		-0.025**		0.012	
	(0.010)		(0.009)		(0.009)	
Cumulated Tickets	0.000	-0.000*	-0.000**	0.000*	0.000**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Subject Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	10061	7646	10061	7176	10061	5881

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. *Baseline Clientelism* is the excluded treatment category, so that coefficients report differences from that baseline. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject in columns 1, 3 and 5, are reported in parentheses.

Table 12: Estimates of Average Treatment Effects, Punishment Only (Logit), Robustness to Controlling for Total Tickets Won in All Previous Rounds

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
Treatment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Punishment Only	0.053**	0.152**	-0.027	-0.096**	-0.026	-0.101**
	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.039)
Round	0.010	0.004	0.001	-0.071**	-0.009	0.085**
	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.006)	(0.031)
Partisan Type	0.002**		-0.002**		-0.001	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)	
Screener	-0.009		-0.026*		0.033**	
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.010)	
Cumulated Tickets	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.000*	-0.002**
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Subjects Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2517	862	2517	744	2517	646

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. To isolate causal effects, the regressions in this table employ *No Clientelism* as the excluded category. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject in columns 1, 3 and 5, are reported in parentheses.

Table 13: Estimates of Average Treatment Effects, Clientelism & Punishment (Logit), Robustness to Controlling for Total Tickets Won in All Previous Rounds

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
Treatment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Clientelism & Punishment	0.047*	0.125**	0.001	0.014	-0.048**	-0.195**
	(0.020)	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.039)
Round	0.008	0.099**	0.003	-0.118**	-0.009	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.006)	(0.032)
Partisan Type	0.004**		-0.002**		-0.002**	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)	
Screener	-0.005		-0.025*		0.029**	
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.010)	
Cumulated Tickets	0.000	-0.001*	-0.000*	0.002**	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Subjects Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2517	894	2517	780	2517	626

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. To isolate causal effects, the regressions in this table employ *Punishment Only* as the excluded category. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject in columns 1, 3 and 5, are reported in parentheses.

Table 14: Estimates of Effects of Outcomes in Prior Rounds

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Declare for A			Declare for B			No Declaration		
Declared for Winner in Prior Round	0.0192			-0.0076			-0.0115		
	(0.0107)			(0.0100)			(0.0082)		
Tickets in Prior Round		-0.0000			-0.0008**			0.0007**	
		(0.0003)			(0.0003)			(0.0002)	
Cumulated Tickets			0.0000			-0.0003**			0.0002**
			(0.0001)			(0.0001)			(0.0001)
Round	0.0118**	0.0086**	0.0056	-0.0068**	-0.0060**	0.0079	-0.0050**	-0.0026	-0.0108**
	(0.0018)	(0.0016)	(0.0046)	(0.0018)	(0.0015)	(0.0047)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0042)
Partisan Type	0.0035**	0.0037**	0.0037**	-0.0026**	-0.0022**	-0.0021**	-0.0009**	-0.0015**	-0.0016**
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Screener	0.0139	0.0101	0.0091	-0.0288**	-0.0255**	-0.0247**	0.0144*	0.0151	0.0152
	(0.0110)	(0.0096)	(0.0095)	(0.0109)	(0.0092)	(0.0091)	(0.0061)	(0.0086)	(0.0084)
Subjects Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	8671	11330	12578	8671	11330	12578	8671	11330	12578

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. Robust standard errors clustered by subject are reported in parentheses.

G Attrition

Table 15: Completion of Treatments, by Respondent Characteristics

	Number of Treatments Completed					Completed All 10 Treatments				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Below-Median Education	-0.200				-0.124	-0.061**				-0.031
	(0.13)				(0.08)	(0.02)				(0.02)
Female		-0.306**			-0.113		-0.021			-0.010
		(0.12)			(0.07)		(0.02)			(0.02)
Age			0.016***		0.007**				0.004***	0.002***
			(0.00)		(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Income				0.000	-0.000			0.000		0.000
				(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)		(0.00)
Constant	9.234***	9.314***	8.661***	9.100***	9.559***	0.842***	0.831***	0.798***	0.705***	0.828***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Observations	1296	1294	1480	1495	1156	1296	1294	1495	1480	1156
R^2	0.002	0.005	0.018	0.000	0.016	0.006	0.001	0.001	0.024	0.020

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Analyses are OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Dependent variable for the left panel is the number of treatments completed by the respondent. Dependent variable for the right panel is a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent completed all 10 treatments; 0 otherwise. Right panel is robust using logit specifications. Independent variables are self-reported. "Below-Median Education" is a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent reported having no education, incomplete or complete primary education, or incomplete secondary education; 0 if reporting higher educational attainment. Results are robust to using a continuous measure of education. Female is coded as 1 for female; 0 for male. Age is a continuous variable in years. Income is reported using a ten-point scale.

Table 16: Completion of Treatments, by Respondent Characteristics

	Number of Treatments Completed					Completed All 10 Treatments				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Primary Education or Below	-0.359*				-0.116	-0.079**				-0.020
	(0.15)				(0.09)	(0.03)				(0.02)
Female		-0.306**			-0.108		-0.021			-0.009
		(0.12)			(0.07)		(0.02)			(0.02)
Age			0.016***		0.007***				0.004***	0.002***
			(0.00)		(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Income				0.000	-0.000			0.000		0.000
				(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)		(0.00)
Constant	9.252***	9.314***	8.661***	9.100***	9.531***	0.840***	0.831***	0.798***	0.705***	0.817***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.19)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Observations	1296	1294	1480	1495	1156	1296	1294	1495	1480	1156
R^2	0.005	0.005	0.018	0.000	0.015	0.008	0.001	0.001	0.024	0.019

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Analyses are OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Dependent variable for the left panel is the number of treatments completed by the respondent. Dependent variable for the right panel is a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent completed all 10 treatments; 0 otherwise. Right panel is robust using logit specifications. Independent variables are self-reported. "Primary Education or Below" is a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent reported having no education, incomplete primary education, or having finished primary education; 0 if reporting higher educational attainment. Results are robust to using a continuous measure of education. Female is coded as 1 for female; 0 for male. Age is a continuous variable in years. Income is reported using a ten-point scale.

Table 17: Estimates of Average Treatment Effects, Rewards (Logit), Robustness to Including Attrited Respondents

	Declare for A		Declare for B		No Declaration	
Treatment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
No Clientelism	-0.059**	-0.087**	0.011	0.017	0.037**	0.075**
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.018)
Lopsided Election	0.040**	0.057**	-0.027**	-0.041**	-0.021*	-0.039*
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.017)
Cost	-0.045**	-0.064**	0.031**	0.050**	0.009	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.018)
Low Monitoring	-0.024*	-0.034*	-0.000	-0.000	0.004	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.018)
Competitive Clientelism	-0.037**	-0.054**	0.044**	0.068**	-0.025**	-0.049**
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.017)
Expressive Utility	0.008	0.011	0.023*	0.037*	-0.030**	-0.059**
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.017)
No Election Influence	-0.001	-0.004	-0.016	-0.023	0.012	0.023
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.018)
Round	-0.012**	-0.018**	-0.019**	-0.030**	-0.008**	-0.016**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Partisan Type	0.003**		-0.002**		-0.001**	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Screener	0.084**		0.038**		0.047**	
	(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.006)	
Subject Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	17040	11808	17040	10880	17040	8568

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. *Baseline Clientelism* is the excluded treatment category, so that coefficients report differences from that baseline. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject in columns 1, 3 and 5, are reported in parentheses.

Table 18: Estimates of Average Treatment Effects, Punishment Only (Logit), Robustness to Including Attrited Respondents

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
Treatment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Punishment Only	0.026	0.094^{**}	-0.018	-0.077^{**}	-0.016	-0.087^{**}
	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.033)
Round	-0.011^{**}	-0.042^{**}	-0.019^{**}	-0.065^{**}	-0.009^{**}	-0.037^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Partisan Type	0.002^{**}		-0.001^{**}		-0.000	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Screener	0.062^{**}		0.035^{**}		0.072^{**}	
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)	
Subjects Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	4260	1220	4260	1062	4260	906

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. To isolate causal effects, the regressions in this table employ *No Clientelism* as the excluded category. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject in columns 1, 3 and 5, are reported in parentheses.

Table 19: Estimates of Average Treatment Effects, Clientelism & Punishment (Logit), Robustness to Including Attrited Respondents

	Declare for A		**Declare for B**		**No Declaration**	
Treatment	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Clientelism & Punishment	0.040^{**}	0.128^{**}	-0.001	-0.000	-0.031^{**}	-0.145^{**}
	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.033)
Round	-0.012^{**}	-0.030^{**}	-0.019^{**}	-0.073^{**}	-0.011^{**}	-0.051^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Partisan Type	0.003^{**}		-0.002^{**}		-0.001^{**}	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Screener	0.074^{**}		0.037^{**}		0.058^{**}	
	(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)	
Subjects Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	4260	1300	4260	1060	4260	876

Note: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$. Coefficients report marginal effects from logistic regressions. Each observation corresponds to a decision in the experiment. To isolate causal effects, the regressions in this table employ *Punishment Only* as the excluded category. Robust standard errors, clustered by subject in columns 1, 3 and 5, are reported in parentheses.

H Screenshot Examples

Instructions (Page 1 of 2)

Obrigado por participar! Você já tem 50 FICHAS para o sorteio do iPhone 5S. Você agora vai jogar 10 jogos para ganhar mais fichas. Quanto mais fichas você tiver, mais chances você vai ter de ganhar o iPhone.

Cada jogo tem uma eleição. Dois candidatos concorrem para a prefeitura – o candidato amarelo e o candidato verde.

Em cada jogo, você vai ter a opção de colocar uma bandeira amarela ou verde na sua casa. Se você colocar uma bandeira, você aumenta as chances do seu candidato ganhar a eleição. Você pode escolher não colocar nenhuma bandeira.

>>

TRANSLATION: "Thank you for participating! You already have 50 TICKETS for the IPhone 5S lottery. You will now play 10 games to earn more tickets. The more tickets you have, the more chances you will have to win an Iphone. Every game has an election. Two candidates run for mayor — the yellow candidate and the green candidate. In each game, you will have the option to place a yellow or green flag on your house. If you put up a flag, you increase the chances of that candidate winning the election. You can also choose to place no flag on your house."

Instructions (Page 2 of 2)

Leia as instruções com cuidado. As fichas que você ganha para cada escolha podem mudar de uma questão para outra.

Em alguns jogos, o candidato que ganha pode te recompensar se você colocou a bandeira dele na sua casa, ou pode te prejudicar se você colocou a bandeira do rival.

Depois de cada jogo, o computador escolhe o vencedor.



O número de fichas iPhone que você vai ganhar depende de quem ganhar a eleição e da sua decisão sobre a bandeira.

Lembre-se que os candidatos e a bandeira não são reais! Clique quando você estiver preparado para jogar.

>>

TRANSLATION: "Read the instructions carefully. The tickets you earn for each choice can change from one question to another. In some games, the candidate who wins may reward you if you placed his flag on your house, or he may penalize you if you placed his opponent's flag. After each game, the computer chooses the winner. [IMAGE: Yellow Ball Chosen → Yellow Candidate Wins. Green Ball Chosen → Green Candidate Wins.] The number of IPhone tickets you will earn depends on who wins the election and your decision about the flag. Remember that the candidates and the flags are not real! Click when you are ready to play."

Weak Supporter of Candidate A (Partisan Type 3)
No Clientelism Treatment, Options Page



TRANSLATION: "PLEASE CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS: [NO FLAG] If you place NO flag: 5 yellow balls and 5 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 44 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 34 tickets. [YELLOW FLAG] If you place a YELLOW flag: 6 yellow balls and 4 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 40 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 30 tickets. [GREEN FLAG] If you place a GREEN flag: 4 yellow balls and 6 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 40 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 30 tickets."

Weak Supporter of Candidate A (Partisan Type 3)
***No Clientelism* Treatment, Outcome Page**
Yellow Flag Chosen, Yellow Candidate Wins

TRANSLATION: "YOU EARNED 40 TICKETS FOR THE IPHONE LOTTERY! [IMAGE: Yellow flag selected, Yellow ball chosen.] You earned 40 tickets! You placed a yellow flag. The computer chose a yellow ball, so the yellow candidate won. [BUTTON: CLICK TO EARN MORE TICKETS!]."

Weak Supporter of Candidate A (Partisan Type 3)
Baseline Clientelism Treatment, Options Page

FAVOR ESCOLHER UMA DAS SEGUINTES OPÇÕES:

- Sem Bandeira



Se você NÃO botar nenhuma bandeira:
- 5 bolas amarelas e 5 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 44 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 34 fichas.

- Bandeira Amarela

Se você botar a bandeira amarela:
- 6 bolas amarelas e 4 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha. Ele te favorece por colocar a bandeira amarela, então você ganha 50 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 30 fichas.

- Bandeira Verde



Se você botar a bandeira verde:
- 4 bolas amarelas e 6 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 40 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 30 fichas.

>>

TRANSLATION: "PLEASE CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS: [NO FLAG] If you place NO flag: 5 yellow balls and 5 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 44 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 34 tickets. [YELLOW FLAG] If you place a YELLOW flag: 6 yellow balls and 4 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins. He rewards you for placing a yellow flag, so you earn 50 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 30 tickets. [GREEN FLAG] If you place a GREEN flag: 4 yellow balls and 6 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 40 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 30 tickets."

Weak Supporter of Candidate A (Partisan Type 3)
***Baseline Clientelism* Treatment, Outcome Page**
No Flag Chosen, Green Candidate Wins

TRANSLATION: "YOU EARNED 34 TICKETS FOR THE IPHONE LOTTERY! [IMAGE: No flag selected, Green ball chosen.] You earned 34 tickets! You did not place a flag. The computer chose a green ball, so the green candidate won. [BUTTON: CLICK TO EARN MORE TICKETS!]."

Weak Supporter of Candidate A (Partisan Type 3)
Low Monitoring Treatment, Options Page

FAVOR ESCOLHER UMA DAS SEGUINTES OPÇÕES:

○ Sem Bandeira



Se você NÃO botar nenhuma bandeira:
- 5 bolas amarelas e 5 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 44 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 34 fichas.

○ Bandeira Amarela



Se você botar a bandeira amarela:
- 6 bolas amarelas e 4 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha. Se ele não ver a sua bandeira amarela, você ganha 40 fichas. Se ele ver, ele te favorece e você ganha 50 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 30 fichas.

○ Bandeira Verde



Se você botar a bandeira verde:
- 4 bolas amarelas e 6 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 40 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 30 fichas.

TRANSLATION: "PLEASE CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS: [NO FLAG] If you place NO flag: 5 yellow balls and 5 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 44 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 34 tickets. [YELLOW FLAG] If you place a YELLOW flag: 6 yellow balls and 4 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins. If he doesn't see your yellow flag, you earn 40 tickets. If he sees it, he rewards you and you earn 50 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 30 tickets. [GREEN FLAG] If you place a GREEN flag: 4 yellow balls and 6 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 40 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 30 tickets."

Weak Supporter of Candidate A (Partisan Type 3)
***Low Monitoring* Treatment, Outcome Page**
Yellow Flag Chosen, Yellow Candidate Wins and Sees Flag

VOCÊ GANHOU 50 FICHAS PARA O SORTEIO DO IPHONE!



TRANSLATION: "YOU EARNED 50 TICKETS FOR THE IPHONE LOTTERY! [IMAGE: Yellow flag selected, Yellow ball chosen.] You earned 50 tickets! You placed a yellow flag; The computer chose a yellow ball, so the yellow candidate won; The yellow candidate saw your flag, so he rewards you; You earn 50 tickets. [BUTTON: CLICK TO EARN MORE TICKETS!]."

Weak Supporter of Candidate B (Partisan Type 5)
No Clientelism Treatment, Options Page



FAVOR ESCOLHER UMA DAS SEGUINTES OPÇÕES:

Sem Bandeira

Se você NÃO botar nenhuma bandeira:
- 5 bolas amarelas e 5 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 34 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 44 fichas.

Bandeira Amarela

Se você botar a bandeira AMARELA:
- 6 bolas amarelas e 4 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 30 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 40 fichas.

Bandeira Verde

Se você botar a bandeira VERDE:
- 4 bolas amarelas e 6 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 30 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 40 fichas.

>>

TRANSLATION: "PLEASE CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS: [NO FLAG] If you place NO flag: 5 yellow balls and 5 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 34 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 44 tickets. [YELLOW FLAG] If you place a YELLOW flag: 6 yellow balls and 4 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 30 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 40 tickets. [GREEN FLAG] If you place a GREEN flag: 4 yellow balls and 6 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 30 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 40 tickets."

Weak Supporter of Candidate B (Partisan Type 5)
***No Clientelism* Treatment, Outcome Page**
Green Flag Chosen, Yellow Candidate Wins

VOCÊ GANHOU 30 FICHAS PARA O SORTEIO DO IPHONE!



CLIQUE PARA GANHAR MAIS FICHAS! >>

TRANSLATION: "YOU EARNED 30 TICKETS FOR THE IPHONE LOTTERY! [IMAGE: Green flag selected, Yellow ball chosen.] You earned 30 tickets! You placed a green flag. The computer chose a yellow ball, so the yellow candidate won. [BUTTON: CLICK TO EARN MORE TICKETS!]."

Weak Supporter of Candidate B (Partisan Type 5)
Baseline Clientelism Treatment, Options Page

FAVOR ESCOLHER UMA DAS SEGUINTES OPÇÕES:

○ Sem Bandeira



Se você NÃO botar nenhuma bandeira:
- 5 bolas amarelas e 5 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 34 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 44 fichas.

○ Bandeira Amarela



Se você botar a bandeira amarela:
- 6 bolas amarelas e 4 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha. Ele te favorece por colocar a bandeira amarela, então você ganha 40 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 40 fichas.

○ Bandeira Verde



Se você botar a bandeira verde:
- 4 bolas amarelas e 6 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 30 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 40 fichas.

TRANSLATION: "PLEASE CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS: [NO FLAG] If you place NO flag: 5 yellow balls and 5 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 34 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 44 tickets. [YELLOW FLAG] If you place a YELLOW flag: 6 yellow balls and 4 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins. He rewards you for placing a yellow flag, so you earn 40 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 40 tickets. [GREEN FLAG] If you place a GREEN flag: 4 yellow balls and 6 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 30 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 40 tickets."

Weak Supporter of Candidate B (Partisan Type 5)
***Baseline Clientelism* Treatment, Outcome Page**
Yellow Flag Chosen, Yellow Candidate Wins

VOCÊ GANHOU 40 FICHAS PARA O SORTEIO DO IPHONE!



CLIQUE PARA GANHAR MAIS FICHAS! >>

TRANSLATION: "YOU EARNED 40 TICKETS FOR THE IPHONE LOTTERY! [IMAGE: Green flag selected, Yellow ball chosen.] You earned 40 tickets! You placed a yellow flag. The computer chose a yellow ball, so the yellow candidate won. He rewards you for placing a yellow flag, so you earn 40 tickets. [BUTTON: CLICK TO EARN MORE TICKETS!]."

Weak Supporter of Candidate B (Partisan Type 5)
Low Monitoring Treatment, Options Page

FAVOR ESCOLHER UMA DAS SEGUINTES OPÇÕES:

○ Sem Bandeira



Se você NÃO botar nenhuma bandeira:

- 5 bolas amarelas e 5 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 34 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 44 fichas.

○ Bandeira Amarela



Se você botar a bandeira amarela:

- 6 bolas amarelas e 4 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha. Se ele não ver a sua bandeira amarela, você ganha 30 fichas. Se ele ver, ele te favorece e você ganha 40 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 40 fichas.

○ Bandeira Verde



Se você botar a bandeira verde:

- 4 bolas amarelas e 6 verdes no pote.
- Se der bola amarela, o candidato amarelo ganha e você ganha 30 fichas.
- Se der bola verde, o candidato verde ganha e você ganha 40 fichas.

TRANSLATION: "PLEASE CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS: [NO FLAG] If you place NO flag: 5 yellow balls and 5 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 34 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 44 tickets. [YELLOW FLAG] If you place a YELLOW flag: 6 yellow balls and 4 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins. If he doesn't see your yellow flag, you earn 30 tickets. If he sees it, he rewards you and you earn 40 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 40 tickets. [GREEN FLAG] If you place a GREEN flag: 4 yellow balls and 6 green balls in the jar; If the yellow ball is chosen, the yellow candidate wins and you earn 30 tickets; If the green ball is chosen, the green candidate wins and you earn 40 tickets."

Weak Supporter of Candidate B (Partisan Type 5)
***Low Monitoring* Treatment, Outcome Page**
Yellow Flag Chosen, Yellow Candidate Wins and Does Not See Flag

VOCÊ GANHOU 30 FICHAS PARA O SORTEIO DO IPHONE!



TRANSLATION: "YOU EARNED 30 TICKETS FOR THE IPHONE LOTTERY! [IMAGE: Green flag selected, Yellow ball chosen.] You earned 30 tickets! You placed a yellow flag; The computer chose a yellow ball, so the yellow candidate won; The yellow candidate doesn't see your flag, so he doesn't reward you. You earn 30 tickets. [BUTTON: CLICK TO EARN MORE TICKETS!]."

I Description of Fieldwork

Fieldwork on clientelism in Brazil was conducted by the author for over 18 months. Prior to and after the October 2008 municipal elections, a total of 110 formal interviews on clientelism were conducted in the state of Bahia. These formal interviews included 55 interviews of community members and 55 interviews of elites. Each of these interviews was conducted in Portuguese, and lasted an average of 70 minutes. Each interview was taped and transcribed, totaling over 4,500 pages of typed transcripts. In addition, informal interviews were conducted of another 350 citizens and elites, as well as three focus groups of citizens. In addition, this fieldwork was supplemented in Pernambuco in mid-2012 with additional interviews of 16 elites and 6 rural citizens.

All interviews were conducted in small municipalities, as defined by those with 100,000 citizens or fewer. In Brazil, 45 percent of the population lives in municipalities with 100,000 citizens or fewer. In addition, 95 percent of Brazilian municipalities are this size (IBGE 2010). The primary field site, Bahia, is the most populous state in the Northeast region of Brazil with 14.0 million citizens (IBGE 2010). Pernambuco is also in the Northeast region with 8.8 million citizens. The Northeast is the poorest region of Brazil and one of the most unequal regions in the world.

In order to identify potential themes, develop interview questions, and field test the citizen and elite interview protocols, the author began qualitative research in a municipality of 10,000 citizens in central Bahia, where he lived for approximately five months. During this time, a stratified random sample of six additional municipalities was selected to conduct further interviews. Overall, the municipalities spanned each of Bahia's seven "mesoregions," which are defined by Brazil's national census bureau (IBGE) as areas that share common geographic characteristics. The sample was stratified to include municipalities with both first-term and second-term mayors. The population sizes of the seven municipalities selected were approximately: 10,000; 15,000; 30,000; 45,000; 60,000; 80,000, and nearly 100,000.

Within each selected municipality, individuals for community member interviews were selected randomly using stratified sampling. Inclusion / exclusion criteria for individuals included the following: (1) at least sixteen years of age (the voting age in Brazil), (2) had lived in the municipality since the previous mayoral election in 2004, and (3) not a member of the same household as any other interviewee. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced representation across gender, age, and urban/rural mix.

Interview protocols consisted of both open-ended and closed-ended questions. An iterative research design was employed; pertinent themes emerging during thematic analysis were investigated during ongoing interviews. While the original, core questions in the interview protocols were asked of all respondents, probes about emerging themes were included in later interviews.

Including both Bahia and Pernambuco, total interviews included 71 elites (primarily mayors and councilors) and 61 citizens (both urban and rural residents). Total interviewed elites included 14 mayors and former mayors, 34 city councilors, three vice-mayors, six party heads, five heads of social services, and several other elites. Interviews were balanced to include a combination of elites both allied and opposed to the current administration.